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The responsibility for the views expressed 1s mine
 alone:; 1 do i:1 fact know 
that much of what I have said is agreed by most of
 the UK wave energy commun ity. 
I have tried to set out a complex t ec hnical develop
ment so chat you can see what 
actually hap pened . It may be that I was too close
 to the heat to make unbiased 
judgements, history alone will decide. 
Abstract 
The paper sees out che need for an inexhaustible s
upply of energy and 
describes the management system established to exa
mine wave en~rgy as one of the 
con tenders £or that role. It then describes che w
ork which has been done 1n 
the UK, seccing out the various costing figures obt
ained and the decision 
making processes which control led the funding. It
 concludes that the work is 
very close to reaching a valuable result and shoul
d not be stopped until a 
prototype has been built. 
1. Introduction 
:-!odern 'IJestern civilisation has developed into a c
onsuming society and one 
of the goods which ir consumes is energy. \.le are 
fast approaching a time when 
there will not be enough energy to meet che demand
s of all groups and ~orst of 
all we are consuming our sources of energy much mo
re rapidly than Nature is 
replenishing them. Something must be done. 
Hundreds of thousands of years ago, ear1y man faced
 a similar dile rmna . At 
that time he was ope·ra ting a :.ife style which archa
c>ologists call "Food 
gathering" and as the human populations grew in nu
mbers they needed more and 
more land upon which to forage for their sustenanc
e. They were consuming the 
fo'od faster than Nature vas replenishing it. Som






Lhey developed agriculture. Thu s was ensured , ~ivr or take the odd drought, an 
everlasting supply of food. 
~e have to ensure an inexhaustiblr supply of energy. 
For some people the source which will provide that exhaustible supply of 
energy is Nuclear po1.1er. Others recognist that thte thermal nuclear po1.1er 
station is also consuming fuel, at a slo1.1er rate perhaps but inexorably for all 
that. People havt proposed a r educ tion in consumption of energy; hence the 
current popularity of Energy Conservation schemes . Certainly these are valuable 
but really they only postpone the dreaded time; they do not remove it . 
Of course the fast breeder nuclear reactor 1s an inexhaustible energy source 
and the present generations of thermal reactors might provide mankind 1.1ith tht 
energy he needs 1.1hile-the complex engineering problems of the FBR are overcome. 
But then again the problems might take longer to solve safely than thermal 
systems could cover. And there might just possibly be serious safety problems 
ari~ing from the use of large numbers of thermal reactors 1.1hich have not so far 
become apparent with only small numbers of stations built by hi ghly expert 
engineers 1.1orking to the highest standards of saf e ty and inspection . 
When he vas Chief Scientist of the UK Department of Energy, Sir Hermann Bondi 
enunciated the "lnsuran.ce Philosophy" 1.1hich vie1.1ed the. "rene1.1able energy sources" 
as insurance against the unlikely failure of the Nuclear programme to deliver 
a safe and inexhaustible supply of energy . Such a philosophy seemed reasonable 
when it was assumed that the R&D for each of the rene1.1able energy sources vould 
be fu lly explored before the insurance was considered valid. 
Under the financial constraints of political economists that philosophy 
has been somewhat distorted and the analogy has been pushed too far . Now 
questi ons are being asked abou t the "premium" to be paid for the insurance, 
ie ho1.1 much does the R&D cost. A situation i s developing in vhich research 1s 
likely to be cut back just vhen the final questions are about to be ans1.1ered . 
This would be a mistake and in the case of 1.1ave energy, a costly and poss ibly 
fatal one. 
To see how much progress vave energy has made in th e past nine years and 
how near we are to the final ansvers, 1 want to tak e you back to 1973. At that 
time the recent oil crisis had concentrated pPople's minds on th~ instability 
o[ our energy supply and our complete dependence on a s~al1 number of countries 
for the oil 1.1e needed. 
During the pre ceding JOO years, there had been work on a wide variecy of 
electric generators .1.1hich were driven by sea ~aves. Indeed t he re is a story 
told of a wave energy device which was used to li ght the lamps on the Pier at 
Atlantic Cicy in 1926. Many and various were the gadge ts 1.1hich were patentee: 
one of the m0rP biza rre 1.1as a giant self-winding ~acer movement. Figure l sho~s 
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some of them. The most popular type \./as a float attached tu tht· sea bed by a 
line \./hose changing length \./aS used to drive various mechanical r.ystems. Most 
of them \./Ould have \./Orked in the sense of generating electricity and that \.la~ 
\./hat their inventors claimed of them. None \./as likely to be economic as an 
electricity generator on a large scale. 
There is, of course, one man \./ho spans the time bet\./een small power units 
and the search for economic large size po\./er stations. Our \./ell loved friend 
commander Yoshie Masuda uho patented and built a \./ave-powered navigation buoy 
in 1947 and who is today one of the world's leading authorities on full-scale 
vave paver systems. We shall hear about his recent vork on Thursday . 
What the early pioneers had failed to recognise vas, vhat 1 call, the 
fi,st law of \.lave energy: 
"Any properly designed system \./ill generate electricity: the trick is 
to do it economically". 
The first of the modern inventor/designers had come into the uave energy 
business because of the economic pressures on energy prices . Thus you \./ill find 
chat the earliest papers by Sir Christopher Cockerell and Stephen Salter \./ere 
\./el 1 sprinkled with £/kW installed and p/k\.lh generated. It is no shame to chem 
chat their early estimates -were later believec to be too optimistic ; it is more 
likely to be the sceptics who will be proved vrong in the end. 
Sir Christopher Cockerell's wave contouring raft and Stephen Salter's 
oscillating vane which later become universally. known as the Salter Duck , vere 
the first two in the UK to receive official recognition; somewhat grudging 
recogniti on, ho\./ever,and by later standards a ridiculously small amount of 
funding. The Department of Energy commissioned our National Engineering 
Labora~ory to carry out a techno/economic survey of wave energy, and the British 
Government's "Think Tank" vrote a report saying t:-iat sea 1.J2.ves could be a valuable 
energy source for the UK. 
The combined effect of those two documents \./as to stimulate Dr Walter Marshall 
whu was, at that time, both Chie f Scientist of Department of Energy and Director 
of Harwell. The stimulation resulted in a sugge stion that the Department of 
Energy should fund a study of the _ feasibility of 1.Jave energy generation and th2.t 
Harve1l's Energy Unit should put together and manage a prograrrune to do that vork . 
Nov why, you may well ask, should a Nuclear Research Establishment like 
Harl.Jell be given the job of managing a very non-nuclear feasibility study. 1 
have even heard remarks about putting Dracul 2 in charge of a Blood Bank. 
The reason "1as that Harwell •.:as then and still is earning half its funds by 
selling its e>q>ertise as contract R&D. A ,.,hole infrastructure of supportin[: 
\ 






that Unit was dra~'TI largely from th
e entrepreneural research managers
 whom 
Harwell had trained over many years
 in widely ranging different disci
plines. 
The principal theme of the mana
gement style of these pe ople ~·as to give 
the research teams the maximum fre
edom to innovate but to keep them movi
ng 1n 
thE-
the desired genera l direction. 
We wanted to engage people to apply the
ir minds 
to the problems not just to ac
t as additional hands to the plough . I
t lS a 
style of management which calls for
 a close rapport between all the p
arties and 
/ 
it is one whose delicate balance ca
n easily be upset by heavy handed 
bureaucracy. 
It was this style of management 1o1hi
ch Har1o1ell \./as called upon to apply
 to 
the ne\.l technology of \.lave energy w
hich Dr Marshall wanted us to deve
lop . 
2 . The Work Upto 1977: A Technolo
gy Led Development 
Follo\oTl.ng fr om Dr Marshall's initia
tive, Harvell put together the out
line 
of a first step towards a feasibili
ty study. There was to be work on
 four 
different wave energy systems and a
 supporting programme of more basi
c studies. 
Those first four systems, which bec
ame kno\ffi as "Devices" ,.,ere: 
- The Salter Duck 
- The Cockerell Raft 
- The Russell Rectifier 
- Th~ NEL Oscillating Water Column 
These basic studies \.lhich became kn
own as the Generic Programme consi
sted 
of the follo\oTl. ng: 
- Wave data collection and anal ysis
; 
- Studies of structural behaviour; 
Investigation of methods of electri
city generation and transmission; 
- The effects of wave energy conve
rsion on the Natura l environment; 
- The search for ne\.l system concep
ts. 
The programme of \./Ork on these dev
ices and the ge neric work was subm
itted 
to the Department of Energy in Janu
a ry 1976 and the first tranche of fu
nding 
(£1 Million) was announced at P Pres
s Briefing in April . 
A set of illustrations \./as prepared
 for that briefin g and these are sh
o~'TI 
as Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
In the terminology which \.le have si
nce developed, the Cockerell Raf t i
n 
the picture would probably be class
ified as an "attenuator" and the D
uck as 
a "terminator". Both \./Ould be said
 to have "mechani cal" power take-o
ff .. The 
Russell Rectifier \./Ould now be call
ed a sea-bed passive sys tem and th
e NE L/0~~ 
,.,as an early example of one of the m
ost promising and versatile systems
 \.lhich 
are covered by the . general titl e of




Around each of these devices was built a team of r~scarchcrs whus~ styl~ of 
working and skills were different and to a very large measure compJenentary . 
At that time the main drive of thosi:: "Device Teams" was co get the maximum 
capture efficiency from their device. 
There was not a great deal known about the real wave climate close to the 
UK and most of the early estimates of power and cost which were presented to 
Harwell by the Device Teams were based upon wave data from Ocean Weather 
Station India, 250 miles out into the Atlantic where a mean ar.nual value of 
80-90 kW/m was recorded (Figure 6). 
Device capture efficiencies were based upon small scale experiments 1n 
narrow tanks or flumes and were in many cases 1n excess of 707.. 
All of this led to the belief that a 1000 km stretch of Western UK coast 
could produce 60,000 M\./ of electricity. Even if an allowance of 507. efficiency 
was made for the generation and transmission systems, the figure of 30 CW, 
which was equal to the annual output of the UK generating system, was huge. 
! always tried to be on the cautious side in the hope that the future 
surprises would be pleasant ones and I worked on the "three fifties" basis: 
50 kW/m in the sea 
507. Device ~apture efficiency 
507. Generation and transmission efficiency 
This calculation led co a figure of 12 CW for 600 miles of coast and to 
the claim chat wave energy. would easily be able to supply half of the UK's 
electricity needs. 
The optimllfT1 which arose from this type of estimate was certainly a 
contributing factor in obtaining f=-ds and in ensurini the interest of highly 
creative engineers . 
I can recall that the Select Committee on Science and Technology of the UK 
Parliament criticised us for not spending money fast enough and on all sides the 
Press sought to have us go faster. We had to explain that we were still an 
infant technology, very much in the research phase and not yet ready for hu ge 
engineering works. The Select Committee was not very impressed and one member 
suggested that we were a "cosy little group" lacking drive and industrial 
advice. 
Although Harwell had a prime responsibility for the content and management 
of the programme, it was being steered by a group kno1.:n as the \./ave Energy 
Steering Committee (\.lESC) which uas chai red at first by Dr Lewis Roberts, who 
lacer became Director of Harwell. The main members of the group were: 
Dr John Wright of the CEGB, Mr Roger Hancock of NEL, Mr Don Gore of the DEn 





As ve got dovn to the detailed study of the pro
gramm<' ve felt a Jack of 
specialist input on tvo important topics, data 
about the vave clim;ite, and the 
behaviour of structures at sea. To fill these 
gaps we persuad~d Mr kobert Ru~sell 
of Hydraulics Research Station and Dr Charles S
mith of Naval Construction 
Research Establishment, to join the group. 
Another significant change to the group occurred 
1.n the Surmner of 1976 when 
Dr Freddy Clarke took over as Chairman. 
Following Freddy's appointment , we did a number
 of things to take note of 
some of the external criticism. We appointed t
wo engineers from industry to 
\JESC; Mr Pat Wyman of GEC and Mr Don To\.ll1end fr
om BP. We also engaged a firm 
of Civil Engineering Consultants to examine the
 estimates of the cost of power, 
believing that it vas structural cost which wou
ld always be dominant. ln order 
to let the main Steering Committee concentrate 
its time on important policy 
decisions and on direct interaction with the de
vice teams, we set up a serJes 
of expert groups each chaired by a member of th
e Steering Commi tt ee vho had 
specialist knowledge in that field. Thus Rober
t Russell chaired the Wave 
Data Group, Charlie Smith the Structures Group,
 John Wright the Generation 
and Transmission Group, etc . These Groups beca
me knovn as the Technical 
Advisory Groups or TAG.s , and although they caus
ed me personally some aggravation, 
they did a splendid job in ensuring that all th
e many parts of this multi-
facetted technology were fully examined . 
The main themes of the programme 1.n the first y
ears were: 
- maximise device efficiency; 
- collect and analyse wave data ; 
examine structural behaviour; 
- estimate the cost of power. 
Under Freddy's enthusiastic leadership, the Ste
ering Co=itcee began the 
pattern which it was to fo llow for many years; 
it visited the Device Teams in 
their Laboratories and listened not only to the
 science and engineering but 
· also to the people themselves . For we believe
 that it is only from a full 
J understanding of the people that you can make 
successful judgements about what j 
to fund and what co stop. 
Thjsperiod saw the beginnings of 1/lOth scale s
ea trials, of the mul~i-
wave wide tank in Edinburgh, of the wave rider 
buoys off South Uist , and of 
the involvement of Rendel Palmer and Tricton as
 Consultants. 
3. The 1977 Workshop in Oxford 
Recognising that with a widely sca ttered commu
nity and 1Jith man:, ne1.· grou?S 
and devices beini; added to the teams originally
 funded , we decided in late 1~77 
to have a workshop/conference. The idea was to
 get everyone to gethe r for a fe ~ 
--
days and to C!Y. r ha:ir.- ideas, report progr1,ss and discuss thL· cost.in ;· v)(L· r c 1~, -
~hich RPT had ca rriC!d out on thC! four original devices . 
Each of tht· device tC!ams and the TAGs 'were given an opportunity to rC!pon 
and there 'was a full discussion of these reports. 
I camea'way from the \./orkshop 'with some very clear impressions . I list 
chem here though not necessarily in order of their importance. 
(1) The costing prospects looked encouraging, and although at that 
time they "were expressed in terms of capital cost per kilowatt 
installed, I give them here in the units 'we later came to use, 
viz pence/kWh delivered. 
Raft 3 p/k\./h 
Duck 2.6 p/k!Jh 
Rectifier 5.6 p/k!Jh 
0\./C 4.2 p/kWh 
The calculation is based on the then assumed mean annual output 
of 657. of installed capacity and an annual cost of 107. of capital. 
The latter figures is based on capital costing 77. and rr:aincenance J; 
costing 37.. 
(2) Much more work was going to be needed'on all topics than I had 
previously estimated. And in particular that there were likely 
to be considerable problems with structural costs, mooring systems 
and the engineering of power take-off systems particularly the 
mechanic a l ones (Ra f t and Duck). 
(3) We should encourage development work on some of the new 
devices which had appeared; notably the flexible bag invented 
by Professor Michael French at Lancaster Universit y and the 
Oscil lacing submerged cylinder invented by Dr David Evans- of 
Bristol University. 
(4) The 1/lOth scale trials were likely to be very revealing and 
should be pursued with vigour. 
(5) The Department of Energy should be asked to f und a three 
year development programne costing f.3M pe r year. 
(6) There should be another workshop in 12 months time and 
at least part of it should be open to th e public and t he 
Pres s. 
(7 ) Finally we had been very fortunate to have br ought together 






Early in 1978 we presented our progress report and future plans to the 
DEn's Advisory Council on Research and Development (ACORD). Although the 
Cotmcil did not give us the three year ftmding which we had requested, they did 
under Sir Hermann Bondi' s skilled management give us the · first years funds and 
an indication eh.it if the prognosis continued to be favourable they would 
continue ftmding. They also r eminded us th.it a near full scale sea trial vas 
an essential step and that we should be reducing the number of device options 
with that in view. Sir Hermann Bondi himself always emphasised the importance 
of "green-sea" experience. 
Throughout 1978 the Device Teams continued to improve their understanding of 
the complex relationship between the power in the sea and the proportion of it 
which the devices could land. This involved changes of shape for some devices, 
different methods of damping to obtain maximum output and the effect which 
multi-frequency mixed direction seas woul d have on device output . 
During this time also, the team at RPT started to do a very much more 
detailed study of the enginee ring designs and to carry out more detailed costings. 
The uata from the South Uist buoys star·ted to become available this year in 
analysed and usable form. 
4. l978 Heathrow Conference and Workshop 
Ti>P. 1978 Heathrow Confer ence was seen by many as a major set back (with 
the hindsight of 1982 it was a very minor one:). · 
The situation in November 1978 can best be expressed in the vords 
Freddy Clarke used in his introduction to the Conference: 
"There is usually a stage in the research and development of technology 
at which the problems loom larger than the solutions and things appear 
to change from month to month and possibly from week to veek. Wave 
energy is currently at that stage". 
We had had a very thorough evaluation of the engineering designs and concepts, 
we had had a close analysis of the South Uist vave data and had taken full account 
of the effect of wave direction on devices fixed in a line predominantly to 
accept waves from the West. 
Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 show the 1978 devices vhich were: Duck, Raft, 
Rectifier, and the Oscillating Water Column. 
The sea energy input to the devices had been reduced from the 80-90 k~/m 
previously obtained at OWS India to 48 kW/mat the new location in 40 m of vater 
off the Outer Hebrides. So "'e had "lost" half the energy in one s t ep . The 
effect of directio~ reduced it by a further 257.; and estirr~tes of device 
capture efficiency vhen applied over the vhole scatter diagram had averaged 
Jo 
•= . - ·------- -..._. 
out at 40-507.. Estimates of the pover chain efficiency and reliability were in 
the region of 507. and 807. respectively. 
The values for the five devices costed at the Heathrow Conference are set 
out in Table I where the original four devices (cost of energy) was in the 
range 20-SOp/k\Jh with the then little knovn Lancaster Flexible Bag at below 
lOp/ki./h . 
The reas ons for this dramatic increase in the cost estimates are really 
three in number: 
Energy available in the sea decreased by 507. 
Load Factor for device output do,;.m from 657. to 25 or 307. 
Capita l Cost estimates increased by 2 to 4 times. 
So the UK wave energy community had problems, but it also had the 
important ingredients of: 
high engineering and scientific quality 
- great dedicat ion 
an enormous capacity for hard work 
- a ma .. .igement that believed in its ability to crack the problems. 
Once again we reported .to ACORD early in 1979. \.le spelt nut the problems 
and outlined the means by which we expected to solve them. Our funding for the 
ensuing year was approved and again we were advised of the importance which the Council attached to a sea trial at near full -scale . 
\.le set about the task of reducing costs and improving device output with 
the objective of reaching a magic figure of lOp/ki./h. 
5. The 1979 Reference Designs and the Maidenhead Conference 
Each of the Device Teams tackled the cost reduction probleo in a different 
way and in each case much of what was learned could be of value in reducing the 
cost of other device systems . 
Before I describe the ~uccessful ones however, I must talk briefly about 
the unsuccessful one. The HRS Rectifier had in the 1918 reference design 
been a massive concrete structure and although its total capital cost was 
lower than the others, so also was its output. A study was initiated early 
1n 1979 to try to find the means of either reducing cost or increasing output. 
vas found that while a modest increase in output could be achieved, the 
sheer size of the concrete structure kept the cost high . The main reason for 
this is that the distance from front opening to back ~all must be a minimwn of 
a quarter of a wave length to prevent the reflected wave from closing the valve5 
against the incoming one. It is interesting to note here that the passive 
lagoon type of wave energy device is believed by Mr Bott and the Crovn Agents 
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to be cost effective in :::or.it locations. This is because, althou)l.h it ciuL" s have 
many of the features of the: HRS Rectifier vhich \Jould tend to makl' it costly, it 
does not require the massive concrete containment structure : that 1s provided 
"free" by the lagoon. All things being considered, ve decided that then, vas 
no possible future for the Rectifier type of device 1n the conditions ve had 
specified and accordingly vork vas stopped. 
The Cockerell Raft designs shovn in Figure 11 are the result of a design 
philosophy called "design for production". The people at Wavepover Limited 
had discussions vith a firm of shipyard designs, A&P Appledore. Basically the 
principle is that all the parts of the raft structure should be fabricated from 
a single type of stiffened steel plate which itself could be mass produced in 
great quantities in a fully automated yard. All the sections of the structure 
are so designed that it is possible to make them from this standard plate. 
Figures 12 and 13 show in outline how this production p~ocess would be organised. 
Comparison of the man hours per tonne achieved in the best Svedish ship yards 
indicated that the targets proposed were achievable . The result of these studies 
vas to reduce the capital cost by a massive [10,000M and with virtually the 
same annual output the cost of energy vas estimated to be reduced by 3 times 
to 12p/kWh. 
The Duck problems vere in the main ass-0ciated with two features of the 
1978 design : the vheel motor paver take-off and the torque transmitting spine. 
The nev 1979 design removed these two features and used instead precessing 
gyroscopes 1n a vacuUlll sealed pod in the nose of the Duck. Figure 14 shows 
this now well known diagram. The result of these changes vas to reduce the 
estimated capital cost by [7000M to £4,200H and with a 307. improvement in the 
output the cost of energy estimates for this system were reduced t'o lOp/kWh. 
The NEL's Oscillating Water Column 1979 design was one of the most radical 
changes since it went from a massive floating structure to one fixed to the sea 
bed (Figure 15) . There wer e as a consequence of this change , a whole sequence 
of other changes which had not been fully worked out by the time of t he 1979 
review. Many of the i mprovements resulted from detailed engineering studies by 
Roxburgh and Partners for the NEL. The ma in ones however vere that the capital 
cost.s were reduced by !:10,000M to [8,000M and because of the higher capture 
efficiency obtained with a fixed system the output was increased by 60! co 
give a load factor of 367. and a mean annual output of 6.3 TWh/year with a 
con~~quent reduction of the cost of energy estimate from 48p/k\Jh to 13p/k\..'h. 
The changes brought about in the Lancaster Flexibl~ Bag (Figure 16) by 
constr~ction studie~ carried out by \..~Land Gifford and Partners were not so 
dramatic as in some other devices because it had started later than the rest 1n 
) 
its engineering studies and had · as a consequence been able to cake advantage of 
the vork done on the earlier studies. The engineering work on this device vas 
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al this Li me being undt!rta kC!n by Sir ChrisLupher Cockerell ':. U·J111 a: 1..·:..v1·111•1.Jl'r 
Limi tt•d, Tht· capi tJl c:ost estim.Jtes at this time 1.Jen, some 607. lt:ss t !t;:i 11 tlot 
prcviuus t:stimalt:S and ,,itli no rt:ducti on in th <: esLimJted valul' uf annual output 
the cost cf energy figure 1,,1as 6p/kW11. 
A ne1,,1 device made its first official appearance in our costing table s at 
this time. This 1,,1as the Bristol Cylinder (Figure 17) invented by Dr David Evans. 
The engineering 1,,1ork had been undertaken by Sir Robert McAlpine and Sons L:mited 
under the guidance of Dr Tom Shaw previously of Bristol University . This device 
vas very much at the early research stage and the designers were keen not to be 
too optimistic in their cost estimates, but rather to leave roon for some l;:iter 
improvement. Their estimates of cost of energy were 14p/kl,~. 
The break do\olTl of these cost figures and the previous years desiFns are 
given in the Proceedings of the Mainhead Workshop and are reproduced here 
for easy reference as Tables II and III . 
There were many shortcomings of the figures produced for the 1979 
reference designs,most of 1,,1hich 1,,1ere associated 1.Jith the short time scale on 
which the 1,,1ork had been done . Most important of these was the lack of really 
substantial 1,,1ide tank test data to give the output figures some real credibility 
arid also that there had not ~een time for the costing figures produced by the 
Device Teams and .those of RPT to be reconciled. 
Other events had occurred during 1979/80(includin g the start of vork on a 
second vice · tank at.the WPL site at Cadnam), vhich vere mostly associated vith a 
wide variety of new device concepts which had emerged prev iously and vere now 
approaching the stage when they had to be given careful study. 
6. The March 1980 ACORD Meeting 
We approached the March 1980 ACORD meeting vith an optimistic progress 
report and a request for funding a ,.,,ider range of device types than at any 
previous occasion. The funding request, which vas basically at about the same 
lP.v~l a~ previous years ([3 -4 H) also included some [500k co be spent on 
developing the hydraulic machinery and gyr:s for the Duck. 
Remembering th::c the Council had from the very beginning been asl:ing us to 
reduce the number of options and move towards a near full scale sea trial, it 
is not surprising chat at this point they said NO. l!nac they did do hovever "·as 
to invite me to come back to their June 1980 meeting "'ith a prograr.r.,<! 
concentrating on a much sma ller number of devices, (t•.·o \./as s ugges ted ·1 , and 
indicating which one should be taken to a sea trial prototype. Quite 
specifically the Council did not believe that the prospects for the Duck \./ere 
sufficiently encouragi ng for it to be worth spending such a substantial sum 




rt·,1~sv~srnc:nt c,( tlit · progranrnt: n,v tl, c,tl!>. \.:t: rc:,li~L· C. that '-'1,:it '-'• · i, ... : h,-v 11 doini-: was to USL· tlc·vict·s and tl,t· tt:Jr.f. asso , i.1t1·c! ,:ith tl,c ·r<· t r, in vC·!;ti,:.t, t !,, various design principles; for cx<1mplt: the '-'Ork on Ducks invt•stir,ati, !'; spint:!; the work on Clams by SEA was invesLigating moc,rin h systems; thi: work on Kait s vas investigating design for production. Re -c: x.amined in this 1,:ay \JC: \Jere ablt· to present a different programme to ACORD in June 1980. 
7. June 1980 ACORD and the T\Jo Year Prograrrrne 
The programme which we submitted for funding in June 1980 \JaS really for three basic device types: 
- the open oscillating water column 
- the mernLrane closed vater column 
- the mechanical pover systems. 
The selected vehicles for these studies vere the sea-bed mounted OWC, the Lancaster Flexible Bag and the Bristol Cylinder. It did not escape notice that the last two were also the most recent designs, there by reinforcing the seconc. law of wave energy that "The device you last thought of is the most attractive". 
Thi-s programme was to last t\Jo years and would culminate in a recommendation cf which device (if any) should be taken to prototype sea trials. Funding vas approved and was in fact slightly more than had been requested in March. This in my view adds credence to the view that ACORD were at that t ime keen to have the work done thoroughly and to bring it to a sensible conclusion, they were not then seeking a means of shutting down the \Jave energy programme. 
In late 1980 and early 1981 the Wave Energy Programme suffered its worst ~lows. Sir Hermann Bondi retired from his post as Chief Scientist at the Department of Energy and Dr Freddy Clarke left his position as Chairman of the Wave Energy Steering Committee. Later he was to leave the Renewable Energy scene completely which made matters worse. With the loss of these two great men we lost that intellectual perception of the problems of managing an i,inovative group and the scientific grasp of the significance of what we were crying to do. 




c·q1J;l l l y rc·~r··c-t t"rl e Y.p l'rt ~. 
Jn thl· fil'lC !-. o! m.'.lintcnanC'C· and reliability \.Jl · follnd th,11 \..' ( 1.•,rc r1.1 J !·: 
h,wini: to c-ovc r completely nt-1,1 ground. Dr Roy T;iyl0r 1.·ill be· t<·ll in 1 \' n 11 .1 11 
abcrnt this work this afternoon . 
8 . The "Mid-Tenn" Report in M;,rch 1981 
To obtain our funding for the second year of the t\Jo year study \Jt' had to 
return to ACORD and report . I had expected this to be something of a 
formality as we had already set out the t\Jo years of \Jork and \.Je re really only 
a fev months into the first year. 
T\Jo things happened vhich \Jere ill omens for the fut ure: 
- there "as a significant bid to shut dovn the \Jork then and there; 
- we 'were required to return with our final recommendations the 
fol lowin g March (1982) thus reducing the time available to do the 
work by 3-4 months . 
We were, after some discussion, granted the money needed but I was given 
the strongest possible warning that the March 1982 report must contain a 
definitive recommendation about which device should be taken to a prototype 
if the costings looked encouraging. In ans\Jer to my specific question, vhat 
figure would be considered encouraging, I was told about Sp/k\.Jh, a figure 
which \JaS given further support by the Department of Energy spokesman at the 
Nairobi Conference in August 1981. 
9. The March 1982 Report 
We pushed on with the studies, introducing considerable refinements into 
the tank work by the use of a representative set of 46 sea spectra which 
could be reproduced in both tanks and which could subject the model to a very 
. c:.;. listic recreation of North Atlantic sea climates. 
I n addition to this improvement 1n the quality of the tank results we had 
also produced the basic costing data to be used by all teams . 
These sets of information lee in many cases to the need for redesign 
to overcome the problems revealed by the new data and with the March 1982 
dead-line fast approaching it was not possible to have all the different 
figures produced by the device teams and RPT fully recon ci led . And even more 
importantly there was not time to carry out the optimisation studies and 
cross fertilisation from one team to ano ther which could have led to a trul y 
representative device design which \Jas as close co economic viability as 
possible. 
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Hl·el,gnisirq· tht:s<· prohler.,:· l prep.irvd :, p:,; ,, : co::op :1ri1 , . ll •· ,, ,. t; · 
fir,ures of J<l'l 1.:itli thosv uf tlit dl'vin· ll·,1~::, lt• ol·. inf tp·. ·.11ci· 1..· ' 1., l r.,i 1•:1: I, 
.1c-l1iP1t·d in tl.<· futun: . TI,, , Jll":iC'<· Te.:Jm:. ' t·,t ir.i .1t<· !': of l'ns1 .,f 1·nl·rr y ·.•, · ri · 
in many casc:s clost to the 5p/k1Jh figure anc five of ·thc:m \,vlit·vl:d tltl:r<· 1.:.1s 
reason to think they could get bc:lo~ that figurt:, The: firurl' s nrc all ~ivl' n 
as Tables ]V and V of thi s paper and the discussion document i!> issui:d us an 
appendix to this paper. 
I also had prepared detailed artists i mpress ions of the various devices 
so that ACORD vould be able to see exactly "'hat Vl: vere talking about (Fi[:urf' ]8-:4). 
1 had estimated that ve vould need a furthe~ 12 months o[ work in order to be 
able to recommend the details of a prototype although it vas clear t hat it 'lo:as 
likely to be some version of a sea bed mounted oscillating varer coluTTU1 . 
The Department of Energy has not yet made its recommendations 
fully available for discussion . However press reports of a 
D.En. briefing suggest that further funding for work on wave 
energy is likely to be very limited . 
10~ The future of Wave Energy 
Having spent £ISM and a huge amount of intellectual input into this vork 
for the past seven years, it seems to rne to be a criminal vaste to stop now 
vhen ve are vithin months of being able to specify a prototype. 
My first reason for this is that ~e cannot be sure vhat the shape of 
future energy needs vill be and must pursue any goal vhich could lead in the 
future to an inexhaustible source of energy. In his forevord to the Severn 
Tidal Barrage Report, Sir Hermann Bondi referred to an "Act of Faith" for 
the future. That is certainly what is needed in \.lave Energy. 
My second reason is much more irrnnediat e and concerns the island and 
coastal communities of the Third World. Many of these people are at present 
paying very high costs for their electricity and for that reason have very little 
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J..:lVL' !-.UC'li .1 C:Oti,llr.lit·; ):,rr.t· ~~·(IU!il!-- of p11i.·vr .Ji )C ·-1 ~·;,/t~.i . .-1: ... : : ,\ j! 
,.:lwll- 1.:ay of li!1· could b1· ckinrl·tl tlr.1matir:.liy. 
tl• thc:r.i p,1 rtiru Lirlv be c ausL· in tlll' c ,;1 str-u c tirin of, !or l'>:Jmplv, . ;, sv;, l,1- ~ 
mounu·d 01,.'C, thc·n· voulcJ be: mucl, usv m:1tlc· of local skilh, r, c·opl L· anti 1:1:1tcri:,J:
; 
,.: ith only a relatively small proportion of capi tal cost b1.;ing imported . 
~~at this project needs is funding for a further 9-12 months so that d 
prototype can be defined and then a commitme nt to build a 2-4 M~ sized module 
from vhich the Third ~orld customers can see vhar the product could do for them
. 
To make such a decision requires imagination, fon,sight and courage. It a]sn 
requires some [l0-20M and Governments tend to br short on these things. 
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T°ABLE I - 1978 DEVICE COSTS 
Device Power Reliability Direction 
efficiency chain i. -a 1 i ty 
7. effic factor 
7. ,i. 
50 (59----.,: 87 65 
51, 01-Y 70 65 
33 ~~ , 92 65 I I 
39 JJ) ; 87 65 
' 
61, 't" i JO 82 65 
I . i 
I I Hean Cost of Load 
I annual Energy* factor output p/kWh % 
TWh/y 
( "-}< 
4 36 22 
2. 9 39 17 
1. 6 I 56 I 9 I 
I ' 
' 
3.8 47 22 
4. 3 9.5 25 
- I 
J:J:,'RC' :1: ·(T ll Fl-<0~'. ~i/,ll lf.;;1:1.,\}1 ~ f1f'.l '.S J! '.' ' J u 7, , 
.. T!,l!LE 1 J 
!'.1:U O'-'C DUCY. RAFT 
1.'\J~ EP. Of Ulll TS 1000 2200 1200 
STRUCTURAL COST £100011 5. B 
4. 7 5. 3 
~CHA ITT CAL CO~Ol'([NT S C.1000H 3.6 
).6 4.) 
MOORING ITC. £100011 5. b 0.9 2 
pO',JER COLLECTION £1000!1 1.0 0.65 I 
20% CONTINGENCY £1000H l. 9 l. 4 1.9 
TOTAL CAPITAL £1000!1 18 11. 2 J 4. 5 
COST OF CMfERSHlP 
10% OF CAPITAL 1.8 l. 12 l. 4 5 
KUN OUTPUT IS A TYPICAL 
YE.AR H\J 430 330 460 
~N ANNUAL OUTPUT 'NH 3.8 2 .9 4 .0 
COST PER IGJH ill PEN0.: 
- COST OF 01.'NERSHIP 
HEAN ANNUAL OUTPUT 47 39 36 
TABLE III 
COSTS OF 1979 REFERENCE DESIGNS OF A 2 G'.' STA
TION 
' 
NEU O\.JC DUCI< RA.FT 
FIXED 
NU!1BER OF UNITS 1400 1500 930 
STRUCTURAL COST £1000!1 4.4 0.3 
..,, 2.0 
!-!EC!iAITT CAL COMPONENTS !'.100011 1.9 2.6 0.5
 
MOORING ETC. £!DOOM 0 . 3 0.4 0 . 76 
PO\.JC:R COLLECTION £1000!1 0.4 0.45 0 .7 
20! CONTINGENCY £100011 1.0 0 . 46 0.6 
TOTAL C\PITAL ~1 000~ s.o 4. 2 4 . 6 
COST OF O'.J:-."E?.SHIP 
lOZ OF CAPITAL 0.8 0.42 0.4
6 
HEAN OUTPUT IS A TYPICAL 
i"'EAR :,r,; 720 470
 450 .. 
~N A..\"l-uAL OUTPt:T r.'H 6.3 4. 
1 3.9 
COST PER R"'H I" .. P::~CE 
- COST OF o· .. ~RSr.IP 
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l ••• . , c ~ \ . , , . ' ,. 1,. l : 
RPl \ Di J P.f'l I 01 !1!r~ j 01 Rri I o; RPi ·1 r:1 J R, ·1 i · o, I ,, i,; -. IJ ~ I 
! 
~~r~-c~u~-~t~lli~ 1296 488 4t0 c-;srJl67718L;.1!164l .135812-3? l-~ 1J1~z-2·~~o·i~G7Z'" 
"- i i - [~ a,3 -&JS 1199 378 961 \1_121_ a~ ss9 7 93 _ _s ~ i2i] si~ 1~20-I ~<i_ 
J.NSJ1t-1RG •. Pi.~1~ _ _222_~7~~~6~ ]_7}_ -~ 1018 630 983j 962 2090jl8t9 
~~-1 ___ .£11 -~-6Q. _?3_~ -22.Q]~2._ 1 o~J 740_ ~-1 ~ . s ~ ~oil ··26~ e3ij so7- 7 .60! -60-
TOT CAP £M 3068 2284 4173 3509 5268!4613 3978 2990 3772 2702 415eh964 7220-~7-33 ------ - ---- ,-1------ -----·-
MAJNT/Annurnfr-: 68 9 35 90 4754.5 61 30 46 41 481 33 l04 b.3 :-o-~ 39-38 46138517.4 16.7 123 37:-:;-~,ss -·,s I 3z sil-zs 
~/AV ___ ~_V?o'%%% %%1%%~~%% 67 ssF½ 
Po1>.€r in kW/m 54 59.3 47 .8 47.8 51 52 51. 3 50 29 . 6129.6 36.2 36. 2 kl. 7 ~ l. 7 
Depth m 100 l OD 42 
I 
45 75 75 90 80 ?1 21 ? c; I ?t; 30 30 
Inst Cap GW 2. 39(2.25 2. 16 2.95 2.8sl2.69 3 .41 j3.41 2.74 2. 63 l3. 18 3.18 12 .85 2.34 --
9561864 No of ·Ucvic es 444 444 356 336 341 320 589 589 756 756 n 900 p 500 
MAO TWh 5.21 5.75 3.37 4 . 16 4.2 4.35 5.28 5 .55 iii~ ~ . 23\4.96 ~.lBp.25 
G-P COE p/kWh 5. 5 3 9.8 a:2 ~8.9 6.5 4.4 6 . 6 a. 1 16. 3 14 .7 ~ .4 
COE p/kWh 5.6 I 3 . 3 10. 2 8.6 l 9 . l 6 .7 lu 9.3 6.3 8 . 7 j6. 3 15 . 5 . 3 
TABLE V - DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL 
NEL 8/W LFB DUCK BOC CLAM 
OT OT I OT OT OT I 
Structure \ l 232 1·1577 \1296 555 \ 1641 \ I I 
M & E ~83x2 157 I 635 \ I 378 559 I -
\ 123 I J & M 630 625 l 074 271 
PCT I 135 \ 740 \ 230 372 519 I I ·-
TOT C 2563 13199\ 12284 12379 2990 I i - --- -
I 5451 ~·;1 t:lI ?11 I 9 90 30 I I ·-
!l D 55 I 30 l 38 l5o . 6 (37 . 4 l I 
11 p & A % ~ [% I¾ ~I : ~~4~ Power in -~ 29.6 -+ 52 ls9.3 _j4?} ~ --- I I i I Depth 21 75 I 1 oo 1 45 I 
-
12 .63 \3.69 12. 25 12.95 \3.4 1 
1---1-~ 
l nst Cap 
>- · -
I 589 I 336 I BE il I 300 132() I \ No of n I 
14. 6 ~u_ Is. 7s ~4.458 j6.0 I 
I 
~·LA,Q_ __ l_Wh I - ·--
\3 . 5 I 3 -14--_J. I G-t COE I 3 - --- ----- · -
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FIG. 12 1 Hull Pro duc tion St ee bl y 
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